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In the Supren1e Court of the 
State of Utah 
LARRY L. JONES and DELLA MAE 
JONES, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
GROW INVESTMENT and MORT-
GAGE COMPANY, 
·. Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATE ME NT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9240 
This action was brought for breach of war-
ranty against encumbrances contained in a war-
ranty deed conveying real pr~perty in Orem, Utah 
from appellant to respondents. The encumbrance 
complained of is a prescriptive right to an irriga-
tion ditch which transversed the property sold to 
respondents. In connection with the construction 
of the house thus purchased, the ditch was moved 
in its location upon the premi~es, but the substi-
tuted ditch continues to cross on two sides the 
lot purchased by respondents. 
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The case was tried to ~he court sitting with-
out a jury. There is a direct conflict in the evi-
dence on material issues. In its brief, appellant 
has set forth as its statement of facts the evidence 
as it was presented on behalf of appellant. Be-
cause the trial court found otherwise, we shall 
present our statement of fact by means of a direct 
qu9tation of the findings of fact as made by the 
court, with citations to the transcript in support 
thereof: 
"1. At some time in the latter part of October, 
1958, the plaintiff, (respondent) Larry L. Jones, 
made a personal inspection of Lot 3, Block 4, Plat 
"B," Keyridge Heights Subdivision, Utah County, 
Utah, in the company of an agent of the defendant 
(appellant) for the purpose of considering pur-
chasing the property (Tr. 22, 69, 72). 
"2. That at such time, the plaintiff, (respon-
dent) Larry L. Jones, saw a visible open irrigation 
ditch across the rear of the said property, said 
ditch appearing to dead-end at the south line of 
said lot (Tr. 22-23). 
"3. That at that time, the ditch appeared to 
be abandoned and there was present therein tree 
limbs, building refuse, weeds, and trash (Tr. 22-
23, 28~ 30, 73). 
"4. That at that time, there was also on the 
premises, but not revealed to the plaintiff, (respon-
dent) Larry L. Jones, a 22 inch diameter cement 
pipe running in a westerly direction from the end 
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of the rear open ditch along the south line of the 
property, said cement pipe being completely cov-
ered and not visib~e on a casual inspection, and 
that said covered pipe continued across the street 
and away from the premises (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 
1, 3, Defendant's Exhibit 7. Tr. 73). 
"5. That the plaintiff, (respondent) Larry L. 
Jones inquired of the defendant's (appellant's) 
agent whether or not the open ditch could be filled, 
as he wanted to completely enclose the rear yard 
and make it secure for a child and a dog (Tr. 23, 
73-74, 150). 
"6. That the defendant's (appellant's) agent 
represented that the ditch could be filled in, and 
the yard leveled (Tr. 150). 
"7. That the plaintiffs (respondents) then ag-
reed to purchase said premises and that on or about 
December 12, 1958, in consideration of the sum of 
of $19,500.00 to it paid, the defendant (appellant) 
conveyed said premises to the plaintiffs (respond-
ents) by warranty deed, in fee simple (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit A; Tr. 68). 
"8. That said warranty deed was without re-
striction or exception, except for deed restrictions 
and easements of record, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A). 
"9. That there was, and is no easement of re-
cord for said irrigation ditch, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
5). 
"10. That immediately after taking posses-
sion of said.premjses, the plaintiffs (respondents) 
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·proceeded to fill in the ditch across the rear of 
said lot, and thereupon learned that there was a 
claimed easement by prescription across the prem-
ises for said irrigation ditch (Tr. 5, 16-19, 24, 31,). 
"11. That there is in fact a prescriptive ease-
ment in others for an irrigation ditch across the 
premises of plain tiffs (respondents), described 
above, and that said easement is actively used by 
the owners of the dominant estate (Tr. 6-8, 9, 12-14, 
16). 
''12. That· by reason of the burdens of said 
easement, the plaintiffs (respondents) have been 
damaged in the amount of $750.00 (Tr. 25, 28, 39, 
47)." 
The Court has pronounced innumerable times 
the rule that, where the evidence upon the trial 
was sufficient to support the trial court's findings, 
this Court would not disturb such findings on ap-
peal S:ee Dusenberry Vs. Taylor's, 7 Utah 2d 383, 
325 P2d 910 .. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THIS CASE TURNS ON ISSUES OF FACT 
ON BREACH OF WARRANTY AGAINST EN-
CUMBRANCES DECIDED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT ON SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, AND 
THIS COURT NEED NOT DECIDE QUES-
TIONS OF LAW URGED BY APPELLANT. 
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POINT II 
IN URGING RESPONDENTS WERE NOT 
DAMAGED, APPELLANT IGNORES THE 
FINDINGS OFF ACT AND THE APPLICABLE 
LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS CASE TURNS ON ISSUES OF FACT 
ON BREACH OF WARRANTY AGAINST EN-
CUMBRANCES DECIDED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT ON SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, AND 
TIONS OF LAW URGED BY APPE~LLANT. 
The appellant conveyed the property in ques-
tion to the respondents by the usual statutory war-
ranty deed form (57-1-12 Utah Code Annotated 
1953) which cpntains, amongst other things, by 
operation of law a warranty "that the premises 
are free from all encumbrances" (Exhibit A). The 
only exception contained on said deed was the 
statement "subject to deed restrictions and ease-
ments of record.'' The trial court found that the 
property in fact was subject to an active prescrip-
tive easement, not of record, for an irrigation ditch 
(R. 27, Findings of Fact No. 10 and No. 11). 
Courts are not in agreement on the question 
whether there is an implied exception to the coven-
ant against encumbrances where the irrigation 
ditch is visible and its existence known to the 
vendee. Annotation, 64ALR 1479, "Easements as 
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Breach of Covenant against Encumbrances" at 
page 1499. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho, in the case of 
Schurberg Vs. Moorman, 117 Pac. 122, 20 Idaho 97, 
held there was such an implied exception where 
canals existed o:r farming land improved under 
the Carey Act. The Supreme Court of Colorado, 
in the case of Ericksen Vs. Whitescarver, 142 Pac. 
413, 57 Colo. 409, held to the contrary where the 
ditch was found to be across. a lot in a subdivision. 
We have found no Utah cases dealing with the 
legal question urged by appellant. The appellant 
cites none. The case of Rollo Vs. Nelson, 34 Utah 
116, 96 Pac. 263, is distinguished in two respects. 
',· 1.; .. 
That case involved a sidewalk running across sev-
eral lots. It was completely obvious to anyone who 
looked, and the agent of the complaining party had 
been upon the premises and had seen the walk. 
Second, the easement was mutualy beneficial to 
the property owners, including the one complain-
ing thereof. 
This Court, in the case of VanCott Vs. Jacklin, 
63 Utah 412, 226 Pac. 460, treated of covenants of 
e:eneral warranty and for quiet enjoyment where a 
part of the land conveyed was lost because of an 
ancient existing fence which did not follow the 
.property line. This Court, in that opinion, com-
mented upon the question of breach of warranty 
against encumbrances such as the one involved in 
this case, as follows: 
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" ... we do not wish to be understood as pass-
ing upon the question of liability of a covenantor 
in case there is an open water ditch or private 
right of way over lands which are the subject of 
warranty. Where such is the case, it is evident that 
such constitute easements and are covered by the 
warranty against encumbrances. The decisions 
as to the effect of such covenants in case there are 
easements which are . open and visible, or are 
known to the purchaser before he purchases, are 
not uniform, and for that reason, as well as for 
the reason that the question is not necessarily in-
volved, we expre~·S no opinion upon the subject.'' 
(Emphasis added). 
We respectfully but strenuously urge that 
this Court, in the case at bar, is still not called 
upon to express such opinion. The facts found by 
the trial court exclude this case from the author-
ities relied upon by the appellant. They are not in 
point. The findings of the trial court shows that 
the easement here complained of was not open and 
visible (R. 26-7; Tr. 22-23, 28, 30, 73-74, 150). They 
further show that the agent of the appellant act-
ively represented that there was no such easement 
and that the respondents could proce~d to fill what 
appeared to be a dead ditch at the rear of their lot 
(Tr. 23, 150). Although the authorities cited by 
appellant may well be good law, we maintain that 
this Court need not decide the issue as urged by 
the appellant, for the simple reason that the facts 
here concerned render the authorities immaterial. 
In Points I to VIII inclusive of its brief, ap-
pellant simply qt1arrels with the trial court's find-
ings of fact. It is further observed that the argu-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
ment under Point VI of appellant's brief ignores 
the fact that the court viewed the premises (Tr. 
4). 
POINT II 
IN URGING RESPONDENTS WERE NOT 
DAMAGED, APPELLANT IGNORES THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE APPLICABLE 
LAW. 
Under Point IX of its brief, appellant urges 
that the respondents were not damaged at all and 
that the court erred in finding damages. Here 
_again, it ignores the record and the trial court's 
·fin_dings of fact. 
The measure of damages in an action on a 
covenant against encumbrances when ~he encum-
brance is of a nature that it cannot be removed or 
discharged is that am~unt of money which is a 
just compensat:lon t<? th_e covenantee f~r the real 
inju~y resulting from the encumbrance. Annota-
tion 61 ALR 11, at page 72 arid following, "Measure 
of da~ages for bi··each of covenants of title in con-
veyances or mortgages of real property," supple-
mented in 100 ALR 1194 at page 1199. 
Mr'. Delmar C. Kenner testified that the value 
of the property was depreciated by the existance 
·of th·e· ditch along the east and south sides of the 
p~operty in the amount of $1,971.~0 (Tr. 39). He 
was qualified as an expert witness and was sub-
jected to extensive cross examination. Three wit-
nesses were called by the appellant to rebut this. 
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Little profit wou]d come from belabouring their 
testimony here. Mr. J. Edwin Stein, as a review of 
his testimony will indicate, had only made a casual 
inspection of the premises, dealt in vague gener-
alities and was unalterably opposed to giving any 
direct answer. Other witnesses for the appellant 
were little, if any better, prepared and we submit 
that their testimony was of small service to the 
trial court. 
Suffice it to say that the trial court awarded 
as damages less than one-half the sum that Mr. 
Kenner's testimony would have supported. The 
court determined that the respondents were in 
truth damaged, and the award of the trial court 
was most modest. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that this case is determined by 
questions of fact, not of law, and that the evidence 
well supports the facts as found by the trial court. 
Because this Court has consistently refused to 
substitute its judgment on credibility of witnesses 
for that of the trier of the fact, this appeal is 
frivolous. The judgment of the trial court should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfuly submitted, 
Allen B. Sorensen, for 
YOUNG, YOUNG & SORENS,EN 
Attorney~ for Plaintiffs & Respondents 
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